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  1Abstract:  
Value-enhanced crops (VEC's) have been the focus of "second-generation" genetically modified 
(GM) crops.  The market power granted by intellectual property rights (IPR) and the use of 
contractual arrangements in VEC gene and seed production have fostered a move toward 
tightly-aligned supply chain industries.   This paper suggests and tests an analytical 
methodology for examining a number of issues in tightly-aligned supply chain industries: (1) the 
distributions of potential monopolistic and monopsonistic rents, (2) choices of licensing 
intellectual property versus in-house seed production and distribution (3) implications of 
alternative marketing strategies and elasticities of demand on the magnitudes of rents, and (4) 
determining impacts on different stages within the supply chain and on substitute commodities.  
The high-oil corn industry is used as a case study. 
 
Key Words:  equilibrium displacement, high-oil corn, mathematical programming, value-
enhanced crops 
 
        
Introduction 
The advent and growth of “first-generation” genetically modified (GM) crops, first 
introduced in 1996, altered the crop production-utilization value chain in many ways.  Large 
companies such as Monsanto, Dupont, Pioneer, and Cargill quickly entered the development of 
technology and intellectual property relating to GM crops, in some cases with widespread 
licensing of the intellectual property to seed companies, in other cases by acquiring seed 
companies.  Bt cotton and herbicide-tolerant soybeans are examples of such “first-generation” 
innovations containing GM input traits which substitute for chemical input usage.  Innovators 
  2maintain market power of GM seed through intellectual property rights (IPR) and are able to 
capture additional rents from licensed seed companies and/or farmers.  Researchers have 
evaluated welfare effects of these first-generation GM crops with various monopolistic market 
structures   (2, 2000), (3, 2000), (6, 2000).   Little analytical research has been completed 
addressing the issues raised by development of "second generation" GM crops, referred to as 
value-enhanced crops (VEC), which contain a value-added component with one or more output 
characteristic(s), such as increased oil or increased protein.  In the case of GM-VEC crops, 
market power may also be negotiated with other stages of the value chain through contractual 
arrangements.   Our purpose in this paper is to suggest and test an appropriate analytical 
methodology for examining a number of issues in tightly-aligned supply chain industries. These 
are: 
  The distributions of potential monopolistic and monopsonistic rents in the crop 
production/utilization value chain.  
  Whether to license the intellectual property or have a presence in the seed production and 
distribution stages. 
  The  implications of alternative marketing strategies and elasticities of demand on the 
magnitudes of rents, 
  The impacts of these alternative strategies on the monopolistic seed and competitive grain 
production stages within the supply chain. 
  The side-effects of alternative strategies on production, utilization and profitability of 
substitute commodities. 
Due to information limitations of other VEC, we use the high oil corn industry (HOC), a non-
GM crop, as a case study.   
  3Review of Literature 
The literature of Equilibrium Displacement (ED) modeling goes back to Reuben Buse (1, 
1958) who called the approach "total elasticities."  Piggott et al (7, 1995) presented a similar 
method and renamed it Equilibrium Displacement (ED) modeling and applied it to assessing the 
impacts of incremental advertising expenditures. ED models, while easily solved with 
spreadsheet technology, have a number of limitations for our purposes:  
  ED models do not handle cases of monopoly or monopsony without modification. 
  Because of constant elasticities of demand, it is conceptually impossible to 
determine maximum residual rent solutions.  
  Expansionary displacements assume no physical constraints to expansion exist, 
e.g. limitations on total cropland or existing production capacity. 
  Contractionary displacements, if resulting in more than 100 percent reduction of 
any activity or process, are a priori infeasible because they imply the process in 
question is operating in reverse in that solution.  
  ED Model supply functions are assumed to be downwardly continuous.  
However, supply functions are truncated where supply price drops below average 
variable cost.   
To overcome these limitations, we adopt a Positive Mathematical Programming 
(PMP) approach. The literature of PMP is replete with applications but there are only 
two methodological articles.  Howitt (4, 1995) explains a pragmatic method of using 
dual values of LP model solutions to introduce quadratic terms that assure the model's 
base period solution matches the base period primal variable levels of the system.  
Preckel, Harrington and Dubman (8, 2002) extend the Howitt PMP methods to 
  4calibrate both the primal and dual levels of the system, calibrating base period prices 
and quantities in a system of agricultural sector supply and demand relationships.  
Equilibrium Displacement Math Programming (EDMP) Models  
 
Following Preckel, Harrington, and Dubman, (8) we formulate the problem as the 
quadratic programming problem: 
Max:    Z  =  f'x - ½  x' H x      ( 1 )  
Subject to:  A11x    =    Free       Indicator Accounts,    (1a)   
      A21x    ≤    b       Technical Constraints   (2) 
      I31x      =   c        Calibration Constraints  (3)     
  x         ≥  0        Non-negativity Constraint  (4) 
Where:   A11, A21=   A matrix of Leontief technical requirements of processes   
     I31     =  An identity matrix of calibration constraints, suspended after  
    c a l i b r a t i o n  
      x    =    A vector of optimized variables (which assures that all solutions 
 are feasible and efficient)  
b  =  A vector of Right Hand Sides of technical constraints  
c          =  A vector of calibration targets to reproduce base equilibrium,   
suspended after calibration 
      f       =     Intercepts of supply and demand processes 
    H    =    Hessian matrix of marginal adjustment costs and demand slopes,  
        assumed to be positive semi-definite  
  5Equation (1a) is necessary because the value of the objective function, Equation (1), is 
confounded by the values of calibration constraints.  Equation (3) is enforced only in the initial 
calibration solution and suspended thereafter.   
We can demonstrate that the EDMP formulation is equivalent to a profit function 
formulation in both the monopolistic firm and competitive industry cases.  Let f(x) be a general 
multi-output multi-input profit function, with x containing both inputs (-) and outputs (+), with 
prices related to quantities, subject to equations (2) and (4).  A second order Taylor Series 
expansion of f(x) in the neighborhood of its maximum (x*) is: 
f(x) = f(x*) + f'(x*)(x-x*) + f"(x*)(x-x*)
2    +   R     ( 5 )     
          1!           2! 
 
Where R represents the higher order non-linearities of f(x).    Assuming the base situation to be 
in equilibrium (a maximum), then f'(x*) = 0.    Rearranging terms to matrix notation, the Taylor 
Series expansion becomes:   
f(x) = f(x*) + ½ (x-x*)' H (x-x* )           ( 6 )  
By definition, f"(x*) is the Hessian, H(x*) and f(x*) is the intercept terms vector, f, of the 
quadratic programming problem.   Changing the sign to negative allows H to be specified as 
positive semi-definite.  Hence, in the monopolistic case, the maximand Z is identical to the 
monopolistic firm's profit function.  Both monopolistic and perfectly competitive behavior can 
be combined for different activities within a single model.  Perfectly competitive supply and 
demand equilibrium is found by maximizing the sum of producers' plus consumers' surpluses.  
The gradient is the perfectly competitive market price and residual rents are identically equal to 
zero.   In the monopolistic maximum rent solution, found by equating marginal revenue with 
marginal factor cost, product and factor prices are the points on the respective demand and 
supply functions that correspond to MR = MFC.   
  6High Oil Corn as a Case Study  
The demand for second-generation GM or VEC crops is driven by the quality attributes 
or characteristics of the particular product.  In the U.S., product quality traits accounted for 18 
percent of all approved field trials between 1987 and September 2004 with interest peaking in 
the mid-1990s.  In 1994 and 1995, more trials were conducted for product quality than for any 
other phenotype category.  Production of high oil corn (HOC) increased from 170,000 acres in 
1995 to just over 1 million acres in 1999.   
Farmers and industry must have adequate financial incentives to adopt technologies that 
may be risky.   In the case of HOC, the product price for HOC is equal to that of conventional 
corn plus a premium based on oil content levels greater than 6.5 percent.  Observations have 
been that there has been slow growth of GM-VEC in general including HOC, which is mostly 
attributed to the low cost of oil substitutes, such as feed fat (U.S. Grains Council, 2002).   
Due to these factors that affect the growth of GM-VEC, it is likely that the demand for the HOC 
trait is relatively elastic. 
Data and Empirical Relationships in the High Oil Corn Industry 
 
HOC is a non-transgenic VEC that can be utilized for animal feed and human 
consumption.  The HOC market is vertically-structured and includes an HOC seed market and an 
HOC grain market.  The HOC seed market includes intellectual property rights (IPR) acquisition 
and licensed seed companies and can behave as a monopoly due to intellectual property right 
licensing agreements established by the IPR firm.   The value chain begins with the transfer of 
the innovation or high oil gene from the IPR firm to a licensed seed company, where a 
technology fee is imposed, the seed company in turn sells high oil seed to growers of HOC.  
Seed companies then reserve the right to transfer the technology fee to HOC growers.   
  7The 1999 production year was chosen due to the maximum penetration of HOC produced in the 
U.S.   Table 1 shows production data for conventional corn and HOC for 1999. The 1999 market 
price for conventional corn was $1.82 per bushel, harvested acreage was 70.5 million acres, and 
average yield per harvested acre was 133.8 bushels of conventional corn.  Seed costs for 
conventional corn are based on the USDA Economic Research Service’s costs and returns 
production data from 1996 to 2001.  HOC production for 1999 in the U.S was 1 million acres 
with an average yield of 129.79 bushels per acre.  The market price of $2.02 per bushel for HOC 
is based on conventional corn plus the average premium of $0.20 per bushel for HOC.    HOC 
seed costs are calculated as the average cost of conventional corn seed per acre plus technology 
fees of $7.27 per acre, the equivalent of $20 per 80,000-kernel bag.  All non-seed input costs 
were adjusted from conventional corn and HOC yields assuming a 3% yield drag.   
Economic Model Structure 
Pricing of intellectual property or technology has often reflected a strategy of maximizing 
market penetration by offering an unlimited supply of the intellectual property and charging a 
technology fee or royalty to cover sunk development costs.  Alternative possible strategies 
include monopolistic licensing of the intellectual property, wherein the innovator licenses 
intellectual property narrowly and extracts the rent maximizing license fee, or monopolistic 
supplying of the product, wherein the innovator monopolistically supplies the product instead of 
the intellectual property.  In Figure 1, monopolistic rents, the upper shaded area, arise because 
the single seller can extract the price indicated by a point on the demand curve, while only 
  8Table 1:  Conventional Corn and High Oil Corn Production Data for 1999
  Conventional Corn High Oil Corn
Data Description Units Estimated Values Estimated Values
Market Price $/Bushel 1.82
a 2.02
b
Harvested Acreage Thousand Acres 70500
a 1000
c
Seed Costs $/Acre 60.00
d 60.00
d
Non-seed Costs $/Acre 153.10
a,e 153.04
a,f
Average Yield Bushels/Acre 133.80
a,e 129.79
g
aUSDA - World Agricultural Outlook Board
bMarket price equals the market price for conventional corn plus the average premium in 
   1999 of $0.20 per bushel. 
cU.S. Grains Council (1999) 
dJones, Philip C., Timothy J. Lowe, and Rodney D. Traub (2002).  Matching supply and
   demand:  the value of a second chance in producing seed corn.  Review of Agricultural 
   Economics, 24(1):  222 - 238.
eAdjustment based on average yield per acre.
fTotal variable costs are based on the costs of producing conventional corn adjusted for 
   high oil corn.
gAverage yield are based on a 3% yield drag from conventional corn.  
  9incurring marginal costs equal to the cost of factors necessary to produce that level of output.  
Monopsonistic rents, the lower shaded area, arise because a single buyer, say of a factor, need 
only pay the supply price of the factor while the net value of the factor to the firm is determined 
by the intersection of the marginal factor cost with marginal revenue.   Any firm in the industry 
that has the market power to control the quantity supplied or set the price at which it can be sold 
can capture either or both types of rents, if it holds a position in more than one stage. 
Which of these three alternative strategies is best depends on many considerations.   Possible 
advantages of each strategy include: 
  Licensing the technology widely under perfect competition, where the technology fee is 
set at the marginal cost attempts to gain largest market share.  If the possibilities are 
  10favorable for widespread adoption and forging a commanding market share, or creating a 
strong demand for follow-on goods and services (such as printer cartridges for inkjet 
printers) this strategy may be the preferred one.   
  Monopolistic licensing, setting the technology fee at the rent maximizing level, attempts 
to recover sunk costs from licensing revenues. If most costs are sunk costs, maximization 
of licensing revenues, such as narrowly licensing the intellectual property to independent 
seed companies may be an appropriate strategy. 
  Monopolistic supplying of the product, at the rent maximizing level of production, 
attempts to cover all variable costs while maximizing residual rents to recover sunk costs. 
If most costs are variable, such as in operating an in-house seed company, maximization 
of residual rents may be the appropriate strategy and model. 
In our model we compare two pure strategies: (1) monopolistic licensing of the high-oil gene 
to independent seed companies and (2) monopolistic supplying of high-oil seed, with (3) a 
base strategy of perfectly competitive licensing high-oil gene with a $20 technology fee. We 
further compare two cases: (2a) inelastic demand for the HOC trait with (2b) elastic demand 
for the HOC trait. 
The High Oil Corn EDMP Model  
Our EDMP model incorporates the above economic structure into a two industry, multi-
stage quadratic programming model representing the HOC and conventional corn industries as 




  11Model Tableaux 
The quadratic programming model tableau and solutions for the base case and the two 
scenario cases are shown in Table 2.  This formulation models the derived demands for HOC 
gene and seed which result from the hedonic demand for the HOC trait, assuming services of all 
intermediate stages are perfectly competitively supplied.  Processes (columns) represent: (1) 
supplying the high-oil corn gene, (2) producing and distributing high-oil corn seed, (3) producing 
and distributing conventional corn seed, (4) growing high-oil corn, (5) growing conventional 
corn, (6) a hedonic demand for the high-oil trait enhancing conventional corn demands (7) 
domestic demand for conventional corn, a portion of which is enhanced with the high oil trait, 
and (8) export demand for conventional corn, a portion of which is enhanced with the high-oil 
trait.  All constraints are less than or equal to (LE), allowing intermediate products to be 
allocated to slack if their price falls below their average variable costs. The Objective Function to 
be maximized in the base case and two scenarios cases, differentiated by the assumed elasticity 
of demand for the HOC trait, consists of a vector of Intercepts and a Diagonal of the Hessian 
matrix.  Finally, the Right Hand Side column is all zeros, indicating supply and demand market-
clearing within the model.  The entries in the Diagonal of Hessian row are the slopes of the 
particular supply and demand functions, defined as the product of the reciprocal of the elasticity 
times the ratio of base price to base quantity, adjusted by a multiplicative calibration constant.  
The Intercepts row contains the intercepts of the supply and demand functions, which are 
initially estimated as the product of the Hessian element times the base quantity plus the base 
price of that product.  The method of calibration creates a set of linear functions that reproduce 
exactly the quantities, prices, and elasticities of the base period. The calibration constant for the 
Hessian element is found by additively changing the intercepts until both the base period 
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Table 2:  High-Oil Corn Model Tableaux and Solutions:  Competitive Licensing (Base), Monopolistic Licensing, Inelastic Trait Demand (Scenario 1), and Monopolistic Lice
              Elastic Trait Demand (Scenario 2)
Production Activity  --> License High-Oil Produce & Distribute  Produce & Distribute Grow High-Oil  Grow Conventional
Intellectual Property High-Oil Seed Conventional Seed Corn Corn
Units -- > (1000 units seed) (1000 units seed) (1000 units seed) (1000 acres) (1000 acres)
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
Scenario 2 Intercepts 24.620 78.750 72.000 -223.999 311.281
Scenario 1 Intercepts 26.750 78.750 72.000 -223.999 311.281
Base Intercepts 26.750 78.750 74.300 -223.999 311.281
Scenario  2 Diagonal of Hessian -0.293 -0.878 -0.005 0.000 -0.007
Scenario 1 Diagonal of Hessian -0.379 -1.138 -0.005 0.000 -0.007
Base Diagonal of Hessian -0.108 -0.325 -0.005 0.000 -0.007
CONSTRAINTS
High-Oil GeneTransfer (1000 units seed) -1.000 1.000
High Oil Seed Transfer (1000 units seed) -1.000 0.388
Conventional Seed Transfer (1000 units seed) -1.000 0.364
High Oil Corn Transfer (1000 bushels) -129.790
Conventional Corn Transfer (1000 bushels) -133.800
SOLUTIONS
Scenario 2 Optimal Quantities (1000 units) 162.463 162.463 25798.000 419.259 70746.000
Scenario  2 Selling Prices (dollars/unit ) -19.996 -64.295 -60.753 -233.397 -226.023
Scenario 2  Factor Costs (dollars/unit ) -8.393 -36.783 -60.753 -233.397 -226.023
Scenario 1 Optimal Quantities (1000 units ) 162.508 162.508 25855.000 419.375 70741.000
Scenario 1 Selling Prices (dollars/unit ) -19.996 -71.933 -61.033 -235.259 -226.030
Scenario 1 Factor Costs (dollars/unit ) -8.395 -36.786 -61.033 -235.259 -226.030
Base Equilibrium Quantities (1000 units ) 387.670 387.670 25645.000 1000.438 70502.000
Base Equilibrium Prices (dollars/unit ) -19.996 -59.987 -60.001 -230.996 -221.760
Demand Activity --> High-Oil Trait Conventional Corn Conventional Corn _TYPE_ RHS
Hedonic Demand Domestic Demand Export Demand
Units -- > (million bushels) (million bushels) (million bushels)
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION
Scenario 2 Intercepts 300.000 7786.667 3742.222
Scenario  1 Intercepts 592.265 7786.667 3742.222
Base Intercepts 592.265 7786.667 3742.222
Scenario 2 Diagonal of Hessian -0.770 -0.801 -1.014
Scenario 1 Diagonal of Hessian -3.022 -0.801 -1.014
Base Diagonal of Hessian -3.022 -0.801 -1.014
CONSTRAINTS
High-Oil GeneTransfer (1000 units seed) LE 0
High Oil Seed Transfer (1000 units seed) LE 0
Conventional Seed Transfer (1000 units seed) LE 0
High Oil Corn Transfer (1000 bushels) 1000.000 LE 0
Conventional Corn Transfer (1000 bushels) -1000.000 1000.000 1000.000 LE 0
SOLUTIONS
Scenario  2 Optimal Quantities (million bushels) 54.416 7570.144 1994.368
Scenario 2 Selling Prices (dollars/thousand bushels ) 258.077 1819.770 1819.770
Scenario 2  Factor Costs (dollars/thousand bushels ) 258.077 1819.770 1819.770 $25.81 Scenario 2 Tech Fee
Scenario 1 Optimal Quantities (million bushels) 54.431 7570.099 1994.534
Scenario 1 Selling Prices (dollars/thousand bushels ) 427.771 1819.331 1819.331
Scenario 1 Factor Costs (dollars/thousand bushels ) 427.771 1819.331 1819.331 $42.80 Scenario 1 Tech Fee
Base Equilibrium Quantities (million bushels) 129.731 7569.626 1994.160




  13quantities and the base period prices are matched to the desired accuracy for all activities.  The 
calibration factor, determined as the ratio of the adjusted intercept values to the original intercept 
values, is applied to the Hessian element and the intercept is returned to its original value.  The 
point of maximum rent extraction in each scenario is found by iteratively increasing the Hessian 
element of the stages controlled by the monopolist until the sum of captured rents is maximized.  
The scenarios represent alternative supply strategies by the IPR owning stage and alternative 
configurations of the elasticity of demand for the HOC trait in the final product. 
Results 
In scenarios comparing the strategies of monopolistic licensing strategy with 
monopolistic seed production we found that both led to identical solutions and identical sums of 
rent extraction over the gene supply and seed supply stages.   Accordingly, we defined the 
scenarios to compare inelastic HOC trait demand (Scenario 1, strategy 2a) with elastic HOC trait 
demand (Scenario 2, strategy 2b) in Table 2. The relative magnitudes of rents extracted in 
monopolistic gene supply versus monopolistic seed supply are then determined by the source of 
the rents—revenue increases or factor savings.  The Scenario 1 elasticity of hedonic demand for 
the HOC trait is - 0.5096, the weighted average of the domestic and export elasticities for 
conventional corn.  In Scenario 2 this elasticity is set at -2.0.  The elasticity of IPR (gene) supply 
for all three scenarios is assumed to be 1.0.  
The major differences between the monopolistic scenarios and the perfectly competitive 
scenario lie in the factor savings from producing significantly less output.   Monopolistic 
throughput, whether measured in acres or production of HOC, is cut to 42 percent of the base 
quantity. The optimal technology fee and the price premium for HOC react in the opposite 
direction from quantities, increasing by 113 percent of the base fee in the inelastic demand case 
  14and 29 percent in the elastic demand case.  The conventional corn seed industry expands 
production to substitute for the reduced HOC seed production.   
Table 3 lists the gross revenues, gross factor costs, and residual rents by stage for the base 
and monopolistic scenarios.   The revenue from perfectly competitive licensing of the technology 
at the $20 base technology fee, $7.753 million, is actually higher than the maximum rents that 
can be extracted in the inelastic trait demand case ($7.597 million).  The maximum rent is 
composed of $1.885 million monopolistic rent from reduced technology stages factor costs, 
$3.770 million monopsonistic rent from reduced seed stage factor costs, and $1.941 million 
monopolistic rent from increased seed selling prices.   
There are strong incentives for the IPR supplier stage to also control the seed supply 
stages.  The reduced seed production costs and revenues from increased seed prices can only be 
extracted by the IPR supplier if it integrates into the seed supply stage. As much as 75 percent of 
total rents arise in that stage.   The optimal technology fee in the inelastic trait demand case is 
$42.80, implying a monopolistic break-even premium of $0.43 per bushel for HOC, compared to 
a break-even competitive premium of $0.20 per bushel.   
In the elastic trait demand case, the maximum rent extraction is the same as the inelastic 
case for gene and seed factor cost savings, but monopolistic rents from increase seed selling 
prices drop to $0.700 million for a total maximum rent of $6.355 million.  The optimal 
technology fee is $25.81 and a break-even premium is $0.26 per bushel of HOC.  Again, there 
are strong incentives for the IPR supplier to integrate into the seed supply stage, although less 
than in the inelastic trait demand case.    
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Conclusions 
The two strongest conclusions are that IPR firms have strong incentives to acquire seed 
supplying companies because the bulk of captured rents arise through factor savings in the seed 
supplying stage, and that the more inelastic the trait demand, the larger the rents that can be 
extracted through increased seed prices.  However, to capture the monopolistic and 
monopsonistic rents requires massive changes in prices and quantities, which greatly diminish 
the size and gross revenue of the firm,   
Given that there may be little monetary advantage to employing the monopolistic 
strategies in the high-oil corn industry -- the maximum monopolistic rent extraction is roughly 
equal to the purely competitive gross revenue -- other goals of the IPR firm may take precedence 
in determining which strategies to pursue.  If preserving or maximizing firm size or market share 
are significant goals, then monopolistic strategies are clearly contraindicated.  If there are limited 
opportunities for utilizing freed-up factors, or low opportunity costs for them, then the purely 
competitive strategy may be superior.    If production opportunities are abundant for released 
factors, or their opportunity costs are high, then monopolistic strategies may be superior.   
The EDMP methods show considerable promise for analysis of market power relationships and 
strategies in multi-stage industries.  Among there most important attributes of the EDMP 
methods for such analyses are:  
  Allowing conceptually correct modeling and efficient solution of models. 
  Endogenizing prices and quantities at all stages of the supply chain.  
  Allowing gradual quantity responses to changes in prices. 
   Assuring feasibility and optimality of base and scenario solutions. Table 3:  Gross Revenues, Gross Costs and Residual Rents by Stage, High-Oil Corn  EDMP Model
Stage -->  Licensing  High-Oil Seed Conventional Seed High-Oil Corn Conventional Corn High-Oil Trait Conventional Corn Conventional Corn
High-Oil Technology  Production/Distribution  Production/Distribution Production Production Demand Domestic Demand Export Demand
Base:  Perfectly Competitive Licensing or Seed Production, Inelastic or Elastic Trait Demand, $20 Technology Fee
(million dollars)
Stage Gross Revenue 7.753 23.260 1,538.721 231.097 15,634.524 25.973 13,774.533 3,628.795
Stage Gross Costs 7.753 23.260 1,538.721 231.097 15,634.524 25.973 13,774.533 3,628.795
Stage Residual Rents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Residual Rents, All Stages 0
Technology Fee/bag $20.00 Break-even Premium/bu $0.20
Scenario 1: Monopolistic Licensing or Seed Production, Inelastic Trait Demand
Stage Gross Revenue 3.250 11.690 1,577.998 98.662 15,989.087 23.284 13,772.522 3,628.718
Stage Gross Costs 1.364 5.978 1,577.998 98.662 15,989.087 23.284 13,772.522 3,628.718
Stage Residual Rents 1.885 5.712 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Revenue Change From Base  -4.504 -11.570 39.278 -132.435 354.563 -2.689 -2.011 -0.077
Total Residual Rents, All Stages $7.597 of which $1.885 is from reduced technology stage costs, $3.770 is from reduced seed production costs, and $1.941 is from increased seed prices.
Optimal Technology Fee/ bag $42.78 Break-even Premium/bu $0.43
Scenario 2: Monopolistic Licensing or Seed Production, Elastic Trait Demand
Stage Gross Revenue 3.249 10.446 1,567.295 98.093 15,990.711 14.043 13,775.921 3,629.291
Stage Gross Costs 1.364 5.976 1,567.295 98.093 15,990.711 14.043 13,775.921 3,629.291
Stage Residual Rents 1.885 4.470 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Revenue Change From Base  -4.505 -12.815 28.574 -133.004 356.188 -11.930 1.388 0.496
Total Residual Rents, All Stages $6.355 of which $1.885 is from reduced technology stage costs, $3.770 is from reduced seed production costs, and $0.700 is from increased seed prices.
Optimal Technology Fee/ bag $25.81 Break-even Premium/bu $0.26
  
17    Allowing different degrees of market power at different stages of the industry – from no 
market power to full monopoly power. 
  Allowing analysis of alternative market power strategies by different stages of the supply 
chain. 
  Allowing analysis of strategies for firms with multiple product lines and/or multiple 
markets. 
Other multi-stage industries where EDMP methods can make a contribution include: 
broilers, contract turkeys, contract eggs, and contract hog production, wherein a competitive 
grow-out stage is typically sandwiched between stages of an integrator firm with market power, 
or in industries such as citrus or dairy, wherein producer cooperatives may have market power in 
one or more stages. 
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